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Abstract. In CRYPTO’89, Merkle presented three double-block-length
hash functions based on DES. They are optimally collision resistant in
a black-box model, that is, the time complexity of any collision-ﬁnding
algorithm for them is Ω(2/2) if DES is a random block cipher, where
 is the output length. Their drawback is that their rates are low. In
this article, new double-block-length hash functions with higher rates
are presented which are also optimally collision resistant in the black-
box model. They are composed of block ciphers whose key length is twice
larger than their block length.
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1 Introduction
A cryptographic hash function is a function which maps an input of arbitrary
length to an output of ﬁxed length. It is one of the most important primitives
in cryptography [14] and should satisfy preimage resistance, second-preimage
resistance and collision resistance. Informally, preimage resistance means that,
given an output, it is infeasible to obtain an input which produces the output.
Second-preimage resistance means that, given an input, it is infeasible to obtain
another input which produces the same output as the given input. Collision
resistance means that it is infeasible to obtain two diﬀerent inputs which produce
the same output. For simplicity, a cryptographic hash function is called a hash
function in this article.
A hash function usually consists of iteration of a compression function with
ﬁxed input/output length and is called an iterated hash function. Compression-
function constructions are classiﬁed into two types: based on block ciphers and
from scratch. The topic of this article is the former. It minimizes design and
implementation eﬀort with secure block ciphers. Its major drawback is slow
processing speed. However, it is compensated by fast block ciphers such as AES.
Furthermore, some recent work has pointed out weakness of SHA families [1,
18]. Thus, block-cipher-based hash functions may become more important.
Block-cipher-based hash functions are classiﬁed into two categories: single-
block-length (SBL) and double-block-length (DBL). A SBL hash function is a
hash function whose output length is equal to the block length. The output
length of a DBL hash function is twice larger than the block length.
It is well-known that the birthday attack can ﬁnd a collision of a hash function
with time complexity O(2/2), where  is the output length of the hash function.
The block length of widely used block ciphers is 64 or 128. Thus, SBL hash
functions are no longer secure in terms of collision resistance.
For DBL hash functions, many constructions have been presented [4, 7–10,
12, 15]. Among them, three DBL hash functions by Merkle [15] have been shown
to be optimally collision resistant in a black-box model: the time complexity of
any collision-ﬁnding algorithm for them is Ω(2/2), where  is the output length.
However, their rates are at most 0.276 and they are not so eﬃcient.
In this article, DBL hash functions are proposed which are more eﬃcient and
optimally collision resistant in the black-box model. They can be represented in
a simple form. They are of parallel type and their rates are 1/2. They are based
on block ciphers whose key length is twice larger than the block length. Thus,
they can be constructed with AES or other previous AES candidates, which
support 128-bit blocks and 256-bit keys.
The DBL hash functions proposed in this article consist of two diﬀerent block
ciphers to be provably secure. Though it seems their drawback, a genuine tweak-
able block cipher [13] will help obtain virtually two diﬀerent block ciphers with
diﬀerent tweaks. Furthermore, it is possible to transform a DBL hash function
with diﬀerent block ciphers to the one with only one block cipher with slightly
lower rate by the method used in MDC-2 [4].
Collision resistance as well as preimage resistance of the proposed DBL hash
functions is proved in the black-box model. In this model, for the proposed
DBL hash functions, second-preimage resistance can be regarded as preimage
resistance for the output corresponding to the given input. In the black-box
model, a block cipher is assumed to be an invertible keyed random permutation.
This is an ideal but still proper assumption in that most of the attacks on block-
cipher-based hash functions do not utilize the internal structure of the block
ciphers. The technique in [3] is used in the security proofs in this article. It is
assumed that two block ciphers are independent in our analysis.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 includes notations,
deﬁnitions and related work. In Section 3, provably secure DBL hash functions
with rate 1/2 consisting of two block ciphers are presented. Security proofs are
also shown. In Section 4, it is mentioned how to construct provably secure DBL
hash functions with one block cipher. A concluding remark is given in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Related Work
Preneel, Govaerts and Vandewalle [16] discussed the security of SBL hash func-
tions against several attacks. They considered SBL hash functions with compres-
sion functions represented by hi = e(k, x)⊕ z, where e is an (n, n) block cipher,
k, x, z ∈ {hi−1,mi, hi−1 ⊕ mi, v} and v is a constant. They concluded that 12
out of 64(= 43) hash functions are secure against the attacks. However, they did
not provide any formal proofs.
Black, Rogaway and Shrimpton [3] presented a detailed investigation of prov-
able security of SBL hash functions given in [16] in the black-box model. The
most important result shown in their paper is that the time complexity of any
collision-ﬁnding algorithm against 20 hash functions including the 12 mentioned
above is Ω(2/2), where  is the output length.
Knudsen, Lai and Preneel [11] discussed the security of DBL hash functions
with rate 1 based on (n, n) block ciphers. Hohl, Lai, Meier and Waldvogel [7]
discussed the security of compression functions of DBL hash functions with rate
1/2. On the other hand, the security of DBL hash functions with rate 1 based
on (n, 2n) block ciphers was discussed by Satoh, Haga and Kurosawa [17] and
by Hattori, Hirose and Yoshida [6].
Many schemes with rate less than 1 were also presented. Merkle [15] presented
three DBL hash functions based on DES with rates at most 0.276. They are
optimally collision resistant in the black-box model. MDC-2 and MDC-4 [4] are
also DBL hash functions based on DES with rates 1/2 and 1/4, respectively. Lai
and Massey proposed the tandem/abreast Davies-Meyer [12]. They consist of a
(n, 2n) block cipher and their rates are 1/2. It is an open question whether the
four schemes are optimally collision resistant or not.
Knudsen and Preneel studied the schemes to construct secure compression
functions with longer outputs from secure ones based on error-correcting codes
[8–10]. It is also an open question whether optimally collision resistant compres-
sion functions are constructed by their schemes.
Recently, Black, Cochran and Shrimpton [2] showed that it is impossible to
construct a highly eﬃcient block-cipher-based hash function provably secure in
the black-box model. A block-cipher-based hash function is highly eﬃcient if it
makes exactly one block-cipher call for each message block and all block-cipher
calls use a single key.
2.2 Cryptographic Hash Functions
A cryptographic hash function H is a function which maps an input of arbitrary
length to an output of ﬁxed length. H should satisfy the following properties.
Preimage resistance For a given output y, it is intractable to ﬁnd an input x
such that y = H(x).
Second-preimage resistance For a given input x, it is intractable to ﬁnd an
input x′ such that H(x) = H(x′) and x = x′.
Collision resistance It is intractable to ﬁnd a pair of inputs x and x′ such
that H(x) = H(x′) and x = x′.
A hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1} usually consists of a compression
function f : {0, 1} × {0, 1}′ → {0, 1} and an initial value h0 ∈ {0, 1}. An
input m is divided into the ′-bit blocks m1,m2, . . . ,ml. Then,
hi = f(hi−1,mi)
is computed successively for 1 ≤ i ≤ l and hl = H(m). H is called an iterated
hash function.
Unambiguous padding is applied to m if its length is not a multiple of ′. It
is outside the scope of this article and is not described here.
2.3 Block Ciphers and a Black-Box Model
A block cipher with the block length n and the key length κ, e : {0, 1}κ ×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, is called an (n, κ) block cipher. An (n, κ) block cipher is an
invertible keyed permutation: e(k, ·) is a permutation for every k ∈ {0, 1}κ, and
it is easy to compute both e(k, ·) and e(k, ·)−1. The set of all (n, κ) block ciphers
is denoted by B(n, κ).
Most of the attacks on hash functions based on block ciphers do not utilize
the internal structure of the block ciphers. Thus, the security of hash functions
based on block ciphers is often analyzed in a black-box model, that is, under the
assumption that e(k, ·) is a random invertible permutation for each k.
In the black-box model, an encryption e and a decryption e−1 can be sim-
ulated by the following two oracles. An encryption oracle e returns a randomly
selected ciphertext for a query which is a pair of a key and a plaintext. A de-
cryption oracle e−1 returns a randomly selected plaintext for a query which is a
pair of a key and a ciphertext. The oracles e and e−1 share a table of triplets of
keys, plaintexts and ciphertexts, (ki, xi, yi)’s, which are produced by the queries
and the corresponding answers. Referring to the table, they randomly select an
answer to a new query under the restriction that e(k, ·) is a permutation for
every k. They also add the triplet produced by the query and the answer to the
table.
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that any adversary with the two
oracles e and e−1 asks only once on a triplet of a key, a plaintext and a ciphertext
obtained by a query and a corresponding answer: Once the adversary obtains
(k, x, y) by a query and the answer, he just keeps it and asks neither (k, x) nor
(k, y) afterward.
2.4 DBL Hash Functions
DBL hash functions with two block-cipher calls in their compression functions
are discussed in the article. Let f be a compression function such that
(hi, gi) = f(hi−1, gi−1,mi),
where hi, gi,mi ∈ {0, 1}n and n is the block length. f consists of fU and fL such
that
{
hi = fU (hi−1, gi−1,mi)
gi = fL(hi−1, gi−1,mi).
hi is not fed into fL and this kind of compression function is called the parallel
type. This type of compression function is considered in this article.
Each of fU and fL is composed of a block cipher as follows:
{
hi = eU (kU , xU )⊕ zU
gi = eL(kL, xL)⊕ zL,
where kU , xU , zU and kL, xL, zL are uniquely deﬁned by hi−1, gi−1,mi.
The rate r of an iterated hash function of block-cipher-based f is deﬁned by
r =
|mi|
(# of block-cipher calls in f)× n.
It is a measure of the eﬃciency of block-cipher-based hash functions.
The major diﬀerence should be noticed between the DBL hash functions
previously proposed and ones proposed in the article. eU and eL are identical
for the former, but are diﬀerent for the latter.
2.5 Definitions of Security
As has been discussed in this section, the security of DBL hash functions is
analyzed in the black-box model. Insecurity is quantiﬁed by success probability
of an optimal resource-bounded adversary. In the black-box model, the resource
is the number of the queries to encryption and decryption oracles.
For a set S, z ←R S represents random sampling from S under the uniform
distribution. For a probabilistic algorithm M, z ←R M(x) means that z is an
output ofM with an input x and the output distribution is based on the random
choices of M and the input distribution.
Collision Resistance. The following experiment FindColHF(A, H) is introduced
to deﬁne the collision resistance of a DBL hash function H with two block
ciphers eU and eL. The adversary A is a collision-ﬁnding algorithm of H with
oracles eU , e−1U and eL, e
−1
L . Let e
±1
P represent a pair of oracles eP and e
−1
P for
P ∈ {U,L}.
FindColHF(A, H)
eU ←R B(n, κ); eL ←R B(n, κ);
(m,m′) ←R Ae±1U ,e±1L ;
if m = m′ ∧H(m) = H(m′) return 1; else return 0;
FindColHF(A, H) returns 1 iﬀ A ﬁnds a collision. Let AdvcollH (A) be the
probability that FindColHF(A, H) returns 1. The probability is taken over the
uniform distribution on B(n, κ) and coin tosses of A.
Definition 1 (Collision resistance of a hash function). For q ≥ 1, let
AdvcollH (q) = maxA
{
AdvcollH (A)
}
,
where A makes at most q queries to each of e±1U and e±1L . ♦
The following experiment FindColCF(A, f, h0) is introduced to deﬁne the
collision resistance of a compression function f with two block ciphers eU and
eL. h0 is an initial value of an iterated hash function of f .
FindColCF(A, f, h0)
eU ←R B(n, κ); eL ←R B(n, κ);
((h,m), (h′,m′))←R Ae±1U ,e±1L ;
if ((h,m) = (h′,m′) ∧ f(h,m) = f(h′,m′)) ∨ f(h,m) = h0 return 1;
else return 0;
FindColCF(A, f, h0) returns 1 iﬀ A ﬁnds a collision of f or a preimage of h0.
Let Advcompf (A) be the probability that FindColCF(A, f, h0) returns 1.
Definition 2 (Collision resistance of a compression function). For q ≥ 1,
let
Advcompf (q) = maxA
{
Advcompf (A)
}
,
where A asks at most q queries to each of e±1U and e±1L . ♦
Preimage Resistance. The following experiment FindPreImg(A, G) is introduced
to deﬁne the preimage resistance of G with two block ciphers eU and eL. G is a
hash function or a compression function.
FindPreImg(A, G)
eU ←R B(n, κ); eL ←R B(n, κ); y ←R {0, 1};
x←R A(y)e±1U ,e±1L ;
if G(x) = y return 1; else return 0;
FindPreImg(A, G) returns 1 iﬀA ﬁnds a preimage of G for an output y chosen
randomly. Let AdvimgG (A) be the probability that FindPreImg(A, G) returns 1.
Definition 3 (Preimage resistance). For q ≥ 1, let
AdvimgG (q) = maxA
{
AdvimgG (A)
}
,
where A makes at most q queries to each of e±1U and e±1L . ♦
Generally speaking, second-preimage resistance is stronger security require-
ment than preimage resistance. A preimage may have some information of an-
other preimage which produces the same output. However, in the black-box
model, for the hash functions or the compression functions considered in the sub-
sequent sections, a preimage has no information useful to ﬁnd another preimage.
Thus, only preimage resistance is discussed in this article.
3 Provably Secure DBL Hash Functions with Two Block
Ciphers
In this section, the security of DBL hash functions with compression functions
shown in Fig. 1 is analyzed. Let f be a compression function such that (hi, gi) =
gi−1
hi−1 hi
mi
fU
fL
eL
eUxU
kU2
zU
gixL
kL2 zL
kL1
kU1
Fig. 1. A Diagram of Compression Functions with Two Block Ciphers and with Rate
1/2
f(hi−1, gi−1,mi) and
{
hi = fU (hi−1, gi−1,mi)
gi = fL(hi−1, gi−1,mi).
fU and fL consist of (n, 2n) block ciphers eU and eL, respectively, and are
represented as follows:
{
hi = eU (kU1||kU2, xU )⊕ zU
gi = eL(kL1||kL2, xL)⊕ zL,
where ‘‖’ is the concatenation and kU1, kU2, xU , zU , kL1, kL2, xL, zL ∈ {0, 1}n
are represented by linear combinations of hi−1, gi−1,mi ∈ {0, 1}n. Namely,
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
kU1
kU2
xU
zU
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ = U
⎛
⎝hi−1gi−1
mi
⎞
⎠ ,
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
kL1
kL2
xL
zL
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ = L
⎛
⎝hi−1gi−1
mi
⎞
⎠
and both U and L are 4× 3 {0, 1}-matrices.
3.1 Collision Resistance
In this subsection, a suﬃcient and simple condition of U and L is presented for
an iterated hash function of f to be collision resistant.
The collision resistance of compression functions is focused on in the remain-
ing part. It has been shown in [5, 15] that an iterated hash function is collision
resistant if its compression function is. The following lemma states the fact in
the black-box model.
Lemma 1. [3] Let H be an iterated hash function of f . Then, for q ≥ 1,
AdvcollH (q) ≤ Advcompf (q). ♦
First, a notation and a simple lemma are given for later use. For 1 ≤ r ≤ 4,
let U(r) and L(r) denote 3× 3 {0, 1}-matrices obtained by deleting the r-th row
of U and L, respectively.
Lemma 2. If both U(3) and U(4) are non-singular, then
zU ∈ {xU , xU ⊕ kU1, xU ⊕ kU2, xU ⊕ kU1 ⊕ kU2}.
♦
Proof. Since U(4) is non-singular, zU can be represented by a linear combination
of xU , kU1, kU2. On the other hand, since U(3) is non-singular, zU cannot be
represented by any linear combinations of kU1, kU2. unionsq
A suﬃcient condition is given for a compression function to be collision re-
sistant in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Suppose that all of U(3), U(4), L(3), L(4) are non-singular. Then,
for every 1 ≤ q ≤ 2n−1 + 1,
Advcompf (q) ≤ q(q + 1)/22n−1.
♦
Proof. Let A be a collision-ﬁnding algorithm of f with oracles e±1U and e±1L . A
asks q queries to each of e±1U and e
±1
L .
Since both U(4) and L(4) are non-singular and
⎛
⎝kU1kU2
xU
⎞
⎠ = U(4)
⎛
⎝hi−1gi−1
mi
⎞
⎠ ,
⎛
⎝kL1kL2
xL
⎞
⎠ = L(4)
⎛
⎝hi−1gi−1
mi
⎞
⎠ ,
the correspondence between (kU1, kU2, xU ) and (kL1, kL2, xL) is 1-to-1. Thus,
once a pair of an input and an output of eU , (kU1, kU2, xU , yU ), is ﬁxed by A’s
query to eU or e−1U and its reply, an input to eL, (kL1, kL2, xL), is uniquely de-
termined. Similarly, A’s query to eL or e−1L and its reply also uniquely determine
an input to eU .
On the other hand, it is necessary to ask a query to each of e±1U and e
±1
L in
order to obtain a pair of an input and an output of f . The fact mentioned above
implies that the correspondence between a pair of a query and a reply of e±1U
and that of e±1L is 1-to-1. Hence, without loss of generality, it is assumed that A
asks a query to an oracle and the corresponding query to the other oracle at a
time.
Since hi = eU (kU1||kU2, xU )⊕ zU = yU ⊕ zU and
zU ∈ {xU , xU ⊕ kU1, xU ⊕ kU2, xU ⊕ kU1 ⊕ kU2}
from Lemma 2, hi depends both on xU and on yU and one of xU and yU is
determined randomly by a reply of the oracle. Thus, hi is randomly determined
by the oracle. gi is also randomly determined by the other oracle.
It is assumed that zU = xU and zL = xL in the rest of the proof. The proof
is similar for the other cases.
For every 1 ≤ j ≤ q, let Cj be the event such that
(xUj ⊕ yUj = h0 ∧ xLj ⊕ yLj = g0)∨
∃j′ < j (xUj ⊕ yUj = xUj′ ⊕ yUj′ ∧ xLj ⊕ yLj = xLj′ ⊕ yLj′),
where xUj , yUj and xLj , yLj correspond to the pairs of the j-th query and its
reply of e±1U and e
±1
L , respectively. Then,
Pr[Cj ] ≤ j(2n − (j − 1))2 .
Thus, if q ≤ 2n−1 + 1, then
Advcompf (A) ≤ Pr[C1 ∨ · · · ∨ Cq] ≤
q∑
j=1
Pr[Cj ]
≤
q∑
j=1
j
(2n − (j − 1))2 ≤
q∑
j=1
j
(2n − 2n−1)2
=
q(q + 1)
22n−1
.
unionsq
The following theorem is led immediately from Lemmas 1 and 3.
Theorem 1. Let H be an iterated hash function of f . Suppose that all of U(3), U(4),
L(3), L(4) are non-singular for f . Then,
AdvcollH (q) ≤ q(q + 1)/22n−1
for every 1 ≤ q ≤ 2n−1 + 1. ♦
From this theorem, any constant probability of success in ﬁnding a collision
implies that q = Ω(2n).
There are many compression functions satisfying the condition given in The-
orem 1. The number of U ’s such that U(3) and U(4) are non-singular is 672.
Thus, the number of compression functions satisfying the condition in Theorem 1
is 6722 = 451584.
3.2 Preimage Resistance
Preimage resistance of iterated hash functions presented in the previous subsec-
tion is discussed here.
The following lemma shows the relationship between preimage resistance of
an iterated hash function and that of its compression function. This lemma is
also implicit in [19].
Lemma 4. [3] Let H be an iterated hash function of f . Then, for q ≥ 1,
AdvimgH (q) ≤ Advimgf (q). ♦
The preimage resistance of compression functions given in the previous sub-
section is presented in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Suppose that all of U(3), U(4), L(3), L(4) are non-singular. Then,
for every g ≥ 1,
Advimgf (q) ≤ q/(2n − q)2.
♦
Proof. Let A be a preimage-ﬁnding algorithm of f with oracles e±1U and e±1L . A
asks q queries to each of e±1U and e
±1
L . Let w be the input of A and w = (wU , wL),
where wU , wL ∈ {0, 1}n.
It is necessary to ask a query to each of e±1U and e
±1
L in order to obtain a pair
of an input and an output of f . As in the proof of Lemma 3, the correspondence
between a pair of a query and a reply of e±1U and that of e
±1
L is 1-to-1. Hence,
without loss of generality, it is assumed that A asks a query to an oracle and
the corresponding query to the other oracle at a time.
Since hi = yU ⊕ zU and
zU ∈ {xU , xU ⊕ kU1, xU ⊕ kU2, xU ⊕ kU1 ⊕ kU2}
from Lemma 2, hi depends both on xU and on yU and one of xU and yU is
determined randomly by a reply of the oracle. Thus, hi is randomly determined
by the oracle. gi is also randomly determined by the other oracle.
It is assumed that zU = xU and zL = xL in the rest of the proof. The proof
is similar for the other cases.
For every 1 ≤ j ≤ q, let Ij be the event such that
xUj ⊕ yUj = wU ∧ xLj ⊕ yLj = wL
where xUj , yUj and xLj , yLj correspond to the pairs of the j-th query and its
reply of e±1U and e
±1
L , respectively. Then,
Pr[Ij ] ≤ 1(2n − (j − 1))2 .
Thus,
Advimgf (A) ≤ Pr[I1 ∨ · · · ∨ Iq] ≤
q∑
j=1
Pr[Ij ] ≤
q∑
j=1
1
(2n − (j − 1))2
≤ q
(2n − q)2 .
unionsq
The following theorem is led immediately from Lemmas 4 and 5.
Theorem 2. Let H be an iterated hash function of f . Suppose that all of U(3), U(4),
L(3), L(4) are non-singular for f . Then, for every q ≥ 1,
AdvimgH (q) ≤
q
(2n − q)2 .
♦
Theorem 2 implies nothing about the preimage resistance for q ≥ 2n−2n/2+1.
It states, however, that the success probability is (asymptotically) negligible as
long as q = c 2n for any positive constant c < 1:
AdvimgH (c 2
n) ≤ c
(1 − c)2
1
2n
.
For example, if c = 1/2, then AdvimgH (2
n−1) ≤ 1/2n−1.
4 Provably Secure DBL Hash Functions with One Block
Cipher
Let e be an (n, κ) block cipher and n + 2 ≤ κ. In this section, the security of
DBL hash functions with compression functions shown in Fig. 2 is analyzed. The
left-side function is focused on. Let us call it f .
The compression function f is represented as follows:
{
hi = e(gi−1||mi||vU , hi−1)⊕ hi−1
gi = e(hi−1||mi||vL, gi−1)⊕ gi−1,
where mi ∈ {0, 1} for some 1 ≤  < κ − n, and vU and vL are constants in
{0, 1}κ−n− such that vU = vL.
Since vU = vL, in the black-box model, e with vU and e with vL can be
regarded as two independent random block ciphers. Furthermore, there exists
1-to-1 correspondence between a pair of an input and an output of e with vU
and that of e with vL.
From these observations, it is clear that the following lemma can be proved
in the similar way as Lemma 3.
Lemma 6. For the compression function f , if 1 ≤ q ≤ 2n−1 + 1, then
Advcompf (q) ≤ q(q + 1)/22n−1.
♦
The following theorem states the collision resistance of an iterated hash function
of f . This is immediately lead from Lemmas 1 and 6.
Theorem 3. Let H be an iterated hash function of f . Then,
AdvcollH (q) ≤ q(q + 1)/22n−1
for every 1 ≤ q ≤ 2n−1 + 1. ♦
For preimage resistance, similarly, the following theorem is obtained.
Theorem 4. Let H be an iterated hash function of f . Then, for q ≥ 1,
AdvimgH (q) ≤
q
(2n − q)2 .
♦
In the black-box model, it is suﬃcient that vU , vL ∈ {0, 1} and vU = vL.
However, in practice, vU , vL should be longer in order to avoid weak keys and to
increase independence. Suppose that con be the length of vU or vL and κ = 2n.
Then, the rate of H is (1−con/n)/2. For example, the rate is 7/16 if con = n/8.
The idea that two block ciphers are obtained from one block cipher by ﬁxing
a part of the key with diﬀerent constants is found in the design of MDC-2 [4].
However, the security proof as shown above does not seem to be applied to
MDC-2.
hihi−1
gigi−1
mi
 
 
vU
vL
hihi−1
gi
gi−1
mi
 
 
vU
vL
Fig. 2. Compression Functions with One Block Cipher
5 Conclusion
In this article, DBL hash functions provably secure in the black-box model have
been presented. They are based on (n, 2n) block ciphers and can be represented
in a simple form. Future work is to explore more eﬃcient DBL hash functions
optimally collision resistant.
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